Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
MARITES O. TAM, A.
M. No. MTJ-05-1604
Complainant, (Formerly OCA I.P.I.
No. 04-1580-MTJ)
Present:
PANGANIBAN,
C.J.
(Chairperson)
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
JUDGE
JOCELYN G. REGENCIA,
MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT
(MCTC),
ASTURIAS-BALAMBAN,
Respondent.
June 27, 2006
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In her Verified Answer to the Complaint, respondent denies all the charges against her contending that: the same are bereft of any factual and legal bases and that they are the by-products of the extreme and uncontrollable desire of Nonito to subject the judicial process to his whims and caprices; during the dates mentioned by complainant, respondent was not only presiding over the MCTC of Asturias-Balamban but was also the acting judge of MCTC Tuburan-Tabuelan and MTCC Toledo City; respondent’s travel from one sala to another consumes much of her official and personal time; her resolution in People of the Philippines v. Conise was not ante-dated because the same had actually been done as early as October 31, 2003 but she decided not to release the same until the stenographic notes are transcribed and finalized so that she can attach the same to the resolution to enable the Provincial Prosecutor to intelligently review the case; respondent had warned Nonito to refrain from discussing the merits of the criminal case in her chambers, but despite such warning the former approached respondent several times asking that the case be resolved in their favor; the detention of the accused in the criminal case was due to the complainant’s maneuverings by amending the complaint from attempted murder to serious illegal detention; respondent took pains in arriving at the truth of the allegations in the criminal complaint by conducting clarificatory hearings; her finding of a probable cause for the crime of less serious physical injuries was arrived at on the basis of the records, TSN and her personal notes. [2]
In its
report dated P11,000.00.[3]
In a
Resolution dated
In her
Manifestation dated
On the other hand, complainant manifested her willingness to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed.[6]
In its
Resolution of
In her Supplemental Comments, respondent reiterates her claim that the instant administrative case is clearly unfounded, malicious, and intended for purposes of harassment. She asserts that she was not moved by malice, bad faith, corrupt practice, or improper consideration when she rendered the questioned resolution in Criminal Case No. 4003-A. She contends that to merit disciplinary action, the error or mistake of a judge must be gross and patent, malicious, deliberate, or in bad faith. Respondent also argues that private complainant is not without remedy because her resolution in the subject criminal case is still subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu and, in case the same is affirmed, the aggrieved party still has the option to appeal the ruling to the Regional State Prosecutor and, thereafter, to the Secretary of Justice. Citing various authorities, respondent maintains that as a matter of policy, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action; that he cannot be subjected to criminal, civil, or administrative liability for any of his official acts no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[8]
In her Reply to respondent’s Supplemental Comments, complainant averred that respondent downgraded the charge from serious illegal detention to less serious physical injuries to favor the accused who is the nephew of the stenographer assigned to her sala; a case for attempted murder was finally filed in court against the accused by virtue of a Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dated April 22, 2004.[9] Complainant prayed that respondent be dismissed from the service.[10]
In its report, the OCA submitted its evaluation and recommendation, to wit:
Complainant’s
assertion that respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in not finding
probable cause for serious illegal detention against the accused deserves scant
consideration. The accusation infringes
on the judicial prerogatives [sic] of the respondent judge, which may only be
questioned through the judicial remedies under the Rules of Court, and not by
way of an administrative complaint.
Besides, the
However,
respondent judge cannot escape from administrative liability for the delay in
resolving Criminal Case No. 4003-A.
Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides,
thus:
Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. – Within
ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall
transmit the resolution of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor,
or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, for appropriate action. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
x x x
x
In this case, no less than the respondent judge
admitted the delay in resolving Criminal Case No. 4003-A. Records show that the preliminary investigation
was terminated on
It was only on
The justifications offered by respondent judge for the
delay are insufficient to exculpate her from administrative liability. The multiple judicial assignments given her
were not unilaterally imposed upon her by the Court. As a matter of practice, judges are informed
about their impending designation either as acting presiding judge or as
judge-designate to try and decide inhibited cases in order to get their consent
thereto. Such consent is an affirmation
not only of their willingness to take on additional judicial assignments, but,
more importantly, of their ability to discharge their judicial functions
efficiently and effectively despite the added responsibilities given them. Respondent judge is no exception to this; otherwise, she
would have sought her relief from her additional judicial assignments. On the delay in the finalization of the TSN,
respondent judge has shown her ability to resolve cases without the benefit of
the TSN as she can very well rely on her own notes in resolving cases. Despite the absence of the TSN when she
prepared the
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, violation of SC Rules is classified as a less serious charge, which,
under Section 11 (B) of the same Rule, is punishable by suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than
three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00
but not exceeding P20,000.00.
It appearing that this is the first time that respondent
judge has committed a violation of the SC Rules, the imposition of a fine of P11,000.00 upon her is appropriate.[11]
x x x
x
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, but modifies the recommended penalty.
On the matter of respondent downgrading the criminal charges against the accused, suffice it to state that the Court agrees with the OCA that on errors in the interpretation of the law, the recourse of the aggrieved party is judicial and not administrative.
The Court
finds the ruling in Claro v. Efondo[12]
applicable to the present case. Thus,
An administrative complaint
is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such
as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari,
unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or
dishonesty. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed
decision or order to the higher court for review and correction.
Furthermore, a judge’s failure to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily render him
administratively liable. The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability –
civil, criminal or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. To
hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.[13]
In the present case, complainant was not left without any remedy when she felt aggrieved by the subject resolution. It was still subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu who, as it turned out, filed an Information against the accused for Attempted Murder. As correctly argued by respondent, if complainant still feels wronged by the Provincial Prosecutor’s resolution, then she still had the option to appeal the same to the Regional State Prosecutor and eventually to the Department of Justice.
Moreover, the Court finds that complainant failed to prove her charges of ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, dereliction of duty, and dishonesty against respondent judge. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.[14] In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[15] Even in administrative cases, if a court employee or magistrate is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.[16] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.[17] In the present case, complainant failed to substantiate her imputations against respondent. Complainant contends that the subject Resolution was issued to favor the accused who is a relative of the stenographer assigned to the sala of respondent judge. However, aside from her naked allegations, complainant failed to present any other evidence to prove her charges. The fact alone that respondent judge found no probable cause to hold the accused in Criminal Case No. 4003-A for trial on the charge of serious illegal detention does not render her liable for ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, dereliction of duty, and dishonesty. Hence, the presumption that respondent regularly performed her duties prevails.
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA that respondent should be held administratively liable for her delay in issuing the trial court’s resolution in the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 4003-A.
Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which specifies the duty of the investigating judge upon conclusion of a preliminary investigation, to wit:
Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge
and its review. – Within ten (10) days after the preliminary
investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the
case to the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in
cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, for appropriate action. The resolution shall
state the findings of facts and the law supporting his action, together with
the record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is
by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused
and the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of cancellation of his bail bond,
if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
Within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the records, the provincial or city
prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his deputy, as the case may be, shall review
the resolution of the investigating judge on the existence of probable cause.
Their ruling shall expressly and clearly state the facts and the law on which
it is based and the parties shall be furnished with copies thereof. They shall
order the release of an accused who is detained if no probable cause is found
against him. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the above-quoted Rule, respondent had the duty to promptly forward her resolution together with the records of the case to the provincial prosecutor.
In Guerrero v. Judge Deray,[18] the Court had occasion to
reiterate that it is the duty of judges to promptly resolve pending incidents,
such as preliminary investigations, especially in criminal cases, consistent
with the constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused to speedy trial and
the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. The Court held
thus:
The
conduct of preliminary investigation by judges of municipal trial courts
and municipal circuit trial courts
is a non-judicial function, which is an exception to their usual duties and
their findings are subject to review by the Provincial Prosecutor concerned.
The performance of this non-judicial or executive function, however, does not
place them beyond the disciplinary power of this Court for any act or omission
in relation or as an incident to their task, which is only in addition to their
judicial functions. Thus, the Court has imposed disciplinary sanctions on
judges for their ignorance or deliberate disregard of the laws on preliminary
investigation.
In
a litany of cases we have reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable
delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a violation of the norms of
judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against
the defaulting magistrate.
Indeed, we have consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases
promptly and expeditiously on the principle that justice delayed is justice
denied.
This
oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more
so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right
to a speedy trial, which, as defined, is one “[c]onducted according to
the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.” The primordial purpose
of this constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by
delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of time. It is likewise
intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice by requiring
judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal
prosecutions.[19]
Respondent’s
contention that she still had to wait for the stenographic notes to be
transcribed, proofread, and finalized does not serve as an excuse for her to
issue the subject resolution six months after the preliminary investigation was
terminated. A period of six months is more than enough time for respondent and
her staff to transcribe, proofread, and finalize the stenographic notes in the
subject preliminary investigation. In fact, the period given by the
Constitution for lower courts to decide a case is only three months.[20]
Granting that this period is still not sufficient for respondent to resolve the
pending incident, she is not precluded from asking for extension of time to
decide the same and complete the records for transmission to the provincial
prosecutor. The Court
has always been sympathetic to requests made by judges for extension of time
for deciding cases and other matters and incidents related thereto.[21]
Neither will the lack of facilities in court as well as the lack of knowledge of the stenographer in the use of computers completely absolve respondent judge from liability for her failure to resolve the subject pending incident on time. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since they are not responsible for his judicial functions.[22] On the contrary, a judge should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subordinates.[23]
Respondent will
not also be exonerated by the fact that she had multiple assignments in three
different courts, which makes it very difficult for her to resolve pending
incidents on time. The designation of a judge to preside over another sala
is an insufficient reason to justify delay in deciding a case because, as the
Court earlier mentioned, he is not precluded from asking for an extension of the period
within which to decide a case if this is necessary.[24]
The Court is not persuaded by respondent’s contention that it would be
impractical to ask from the Court for extension of time to resolve cases
assigned to her because before the extension could be granted another case will
be due for decision and respondent will again be constrained to ask for another
extension which is not good for her image. The fact that cases and other
pending incidents become successively due for decision or resolution is
precisely the reason why respondent should have asked for extra time to decide
or resolve these matters. It is simply unjustified on respondent’s end to argue
on the premise that it is bad for her image to regularly ask for extensions. If
she really does not want to ask for additional time to resolve pending matters
then she should strive to meet her deadlines; otherwise, she has no choice but
to ask for extensions. If she fails to do so and the period lapses, as in the
present case, she becomes administratively liable for delay.
Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.02 and Canon 3, Rule 3.05, of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Rule 1.02. – A judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay.
Rule 3.05. – A judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
The
Court has always impressed upon all members of the judiciary the need to decide
cases promptly and expeditiously.[25] The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay.[26] They must dispose of the court's business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods.[27] Failure of a judge to decide a case within the prescribed
period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a
disciplinary sanction.[28]
Section 9(4),
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies undue delay in rendering a decision
or order, or in transmitting the records of a case and violation of Supreme
Court rules, directives and circulars as a less serious charge. Under Section
11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty imposed, if the respondent is found guilty
of a less serious charge, is either suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a
fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Considering,
however, that respondent judge has been in the service of the judiciary for 11
years and it appearing that this is her first administrative offense of this
nature, the Court finds it proper to impose a lesser penalty.[29]
Moreover, the fact that respondent judge is also assigned in another circuit
court and one city court also mitigates her liability.[30]
Hence, the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00
is deemed commensurate to the infraction committed by respondent judge.[31]
WHEREFORE,
respondent judge is found GUILTY of GROSS INEFFICIENCY. She is
ordered to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-10.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Annex “H”, Verified Answer to the
Complaint, id.
at 181-182.
[10]
[11]
[12] A.M. No. MTJ-05-1585,
[13]
[14] Go v. Achas,
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564,
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] 442 Phil. 85 (2002).
[19]
[20] Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 15.
[21] Office of the
Court Administrator v. Avelino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1606,
[22] Office of the
Court Administrator v. Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1737,
[23]
[24] Supra note 20, at 16-17.
[25] Ricafranca, Jr. v. Judge Lopez, 398 Phil. 520, 524 (2000).
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Taran v.
Jacinto, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1436,
[30] Supra note 21, at 16.
[31] Pesayco v.
Layague, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1889,